במדבר, פרק ט׳, פסוק ג׳

The directive to prepare the Passover sacrifice in the desert serves as a bridge between the singular event experienced in Egypt and the permanent practices established for all future generations. While certain early requirements, such as placing blood on the doorposts, were unique to the exodus, the essential framework of the original Passover remained permanently binding [ביאור שטיינזלץ]. The directive is addressed to the entire nation, incorporating Moses himself into the collective public obligation [רש״ר הירש].

The preparation is set for the late afternoon, specifically the window of time between the setting of the sun and the emergence of the stars that marks the arrival of night [ביאור שטיינזלץ, שד״ל]. The physical preparation involves a sequence of actions, including the initial readiness, the slaughter, and the service on the altar [הטור הארוך, ביאור שטיינזלץ]. A fundamental legal principle emerges from the requirement that the sacrifice be offered at its exact appointed time. Because this schedule is strictly fixed, it overrides other severe prohibitions. The sacrifice must proceed even if the designated day falls on the Sabbath, and even if the entire community is in a state of ritual impurity [העמק דבר, צפנת פענח, רש״ר הירש].

Although the preparation of the sacrifice occurs during the day, the instruction to follow all its related statutes and ordinances expands the scope of the requirement. This broad inclusion encompasses the rules for eating the sacrifice, an act that takes place during the following night [רמב״ן, הטור הארוך].

Commentators offer different perspectives on the distinction between statutes and ordinances. One approach differentiates them based on the reasoning behind the Commandments. Statutes are requirements without an explicit explanation in the text, such as the rule that the sacrifice must be an unblemished male lamb. Ordinances, conversely, are Commandments with clear, stated purposes, such as eating matzah to recall the hasty departure from Egypt, and consuming bitter herbs to remember the harsh slavery [משכיל לדוד]. Another perspective views the distinction through the lens of legal origins. Statutes represent laws derived through traditional principles of biblical interpretation, while ordinances represent the oral traditions established by Moses and his court [העמק דבר]. In this context, an ordinance is understood not merely as a dry rule, but as the proper and fair course of action [נתינה לגר].

A significant discussion arises regarding how specific practical Commandments fit into these two categories. One view suggests that statutes relate directly to the physical state of the animal, requiring it to be an unblemished, one-year-old male with no broken bones. Ordinances, according to this view, encompass accompanying rules, such as the obligation to eat matzah and the prohibition against possessing leaven for seven days [רלב״ג, חזקוני, והגרסה המקורית ברש״י]. However, many commentators strongly dispute this conclusion, arguing that the seven-day rules regarding leaven and matzah cannot be included in this specific instruction. Their primary proof stems from the laws of the Second Passover, which employ the exact same terminology. Since it is entirely permissible to keep leaven in the house during the Second Passover, the terms must mean something else. Therefore, this approach concludes that while statutes indeed govern the physical requirements of the animal, ordinances do not refer to leaven or matzah. Instead, they govern the specific actions performed on the sacrifice itself, such as the requirement to roast it whole over a fire along with its head, legs, and inner organs [רמב״ן, מזרחי, גור אריה, שפתי חכמים, ורש״ר הירש].