ויקרא, פרק כ״ז, פסוק כ״ט

פרשת בחוקתי

Leviticus 27:29Sefaria

כׇּל־חֵ֗רֶם אֲשֶׁ֧ר יׇחֳרַ֛ם מִן־הָאָדָ֖ם לֹ֣א יִפָּדֶ֑ה מ֖וֹת יוּמָֽת׃

At the conclusion of the laws concerning valuations and sanctuary donations, a severe and uncompromising rule emerges regarding a person condemned to destruction. Unlike ordinary pledges, a human life placed under this ultimate ban cannot be bought back with money. Commentators offer two primary ways to understand the nature of this decree, viewing it either through a national lens or a strict legal framework.

On a national level, this decree involves a public ban imposed by a king, the Sanhedrin, or the supreme leadership during times of war or rebellion [רמב״ן, שד״ל, רלב״ג]. The passive nature of the command indicates that this is not a private individual attempting to condemn his own household, but rather a supreme authority passing a collective or personal judgment [אבן עזרא]. This applies specifically to outsiders or adversaries, such as enemy nations marked for destruction during combat, or domestic rebels who have violated a public oath, similar to the historical cases of the men of Jabesh Gilead or Jonathan the son of Saul [רמב״ן, רבינו בחיי, ביאור יש״ר, הופמן]. Such a ban is absolute, and those condemned under it have no option to redeem themselves financially.

Understanding this national context sheds light on the tragic mistake made by Jephthah the Gileadite when he sacrificed his daughter. Jephthah mistakenly believed that just as a king or supreme court can condemn rebels and enemies to death without the possibility of redemption, he too could make a wartime vow to sacrifice a human being to God. He was gravely mistaken. A national ban applies only to eliminating rebels and active enemies, while the Torah absolutely forbids offering a sacrifice from something unfit for the altar. His catastrophic decision stemmed from a complete ignorance of Torah law [רמב״ן, רבינו בחיי, הטור הארוך].

The primary approach among commentators, rooted in Rabbinic tradition, shifts the focus from the battlefield to the courtroom. In this view, the law deals with an individual who has been sentenced to death by a court for a severe crime [רשב״ם, בכור שור, חזקוני]. If an onlooker steps forward and offers to donate the condemned person's monetary value to the sanctuary, the pledge is entirely void and carries no legal weight [רש״י, מזרחי, הכתב והקבלה]. The reasoning is that once a death sentence is finalized, the criminal is legally considered a dead person walking. Since a deceased person has no financial value, no monetary assessment can be made [רש״י, שפתי חכמים, גור אריה].

Beyond the technicalities of financial valuation, this law establishes a profound principle of Divine justice. While donating property is an act of free will that allows for monetary substitution, a death sentence is an expression of absolute truth and Divine judgment. Just as truth has no substitute, justice cannot be bribed. A court cannot take a ransom for a person guilty of a capital offense, nor can a severe punishment be converted into a financial payment [רש ר הירש, תורה תמימה, מלבי״ם].

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