The laws of the Torah establish clear boundaries regarding the control one human being can exert over another, ensuring that even those in a state of servitude retain their inherent human dignity and the absolute sanctity of life. The law carefully restricts a master's power, drawing a firm line between permissible disciplinary action and outright murder, and imposes a severe penalty on any master who crosses that line.
The primary approach among commentators is that this law applies specifically to a non-Hebrew slave who is acquired permanently as the master's property. A Hebrew slave, by contrast, is generally subject to the exact same laws as any other Israelite. However, a differing view maintains that this ruling applies equally to both Hebrew and non-Hebrew slaves, reflecting the principle that the justice of the Torah is applied equally to all [אבן עזרא].
Masters were historically permitted to use standard disciplinary tools, such as a stick or a whip, to correct a servant's behavior. While striking for discipline is allowed, dealing a cruel, excessive, and fatal blow is strictly forbidden [רמב״ן, ספורנו, חזקוני]. The type of instrument used introduces a crucial legal distinction regarding the master's intent. If a master strikes a servant with an inherently lethal object, like a sword, knife, or stone, it is clear that his intention was to murder rather than to discipline. In such a case, he is judged immediately as a murderer and faces the death penalty, even if the victim manages to survive for a short period after the attack [רשב״ם, אור החיים, שד״ל]. Furthermore, to hold the master fully liable for murder when using a standard disciplinary tool, the object must possess sufficient size and force to cause death, a standard derived from the laws regarding the murder of a free person [רש״י, מזרחי, ברטנורא].
For the master to be held liable, the death must occur under specific circumstances. The simplest understanding is that the servant dies immediately during the beating as a direct result of the blows [רמב״ן, חזקוני, קאסוטו]. Additionally, the servant must die while still legally under the ownership and domain of the master who struck him. If a master beats a servant but then sells him to someone else, and the servant subsequently dies under the new owner's authority, the original master is exempt from this specific punishment [מלבי״ם, צפנת פענח, חזקוני].
The penalty for killing the servant is execution by the court, specifically through beheading by the sword. The fact that this penalty is framed as an act of vengeance, rather than a standard execution, sparks significant discussion. Some explain that because the master extinguished the servant's life through prolonged suffering, he is subject to severe punishment and heavenly retribution beyond the execution itself [העמק דבר]. Others view the language as an expression of measure for measure, indicating that the master will be dealt with exactly as he acted [הכתב והקבלה], or as a hint that the master acted with cunning and personal vindictiveness [רבנו חננאל, רבנו בחיי].
A profound social insight is that a servant lacks a free family to act as a blood avenger and demand justice. Therefore, society as a whole, acting through the court, must step in to avenge his blood and restore his trampled human dignity [רש״ר הירש]. By utilizing terminology rooted in ancient customs of blood revenge, the Torah introduces a massive moral innovation: a servant is also created in the image of God, and anyone who violates the sanctity of his life is subject to the death penalty, exactly like one who murders a free individual [קאסוטו].